

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332859024>

# The Great Divider: Obama's Influence on Trust in Government and Racial Attitudes<sup>1</sup>

Chapter · May 2019

---

CITATIONS

4

READS

105

1 author:



**Emmitt Riley**

DePauw University

11 PUBLICATIONS 5 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Book Project [View project](#)

# The Great Divider: Obama's Influence on Trust in Government and Racial Attitudes<sup>1</sup>

*Clarissa Peterson and Emmitt Y. Riley III*

## **The 2008 Presidential Election and the False Hope of a Postracial America?**

“Obama’s presidency represents the paradox of American representation. Obama represents for all of us because he stands as the symbol of America to the world. He also represents to the American citizenry proof of progress in a nation that has never before embraced a black commander in chief. Yet a third sense of representation has a racial tinge, because Obama is also a representation of a black populace that, until his election, had been excluded from the highest reach of political representation.”

—Michael Eric Dyson, *The Black Presidency*<sup>2</sup>

Since 2008, scholars have debated the degree to which race has impacted vote choice among whites and their job approval rating for America’s first

African American President. Although scholars have yet to reach a consensus on how the Obama presidency has reshaped the political landscape, the empirical research has provided important insights on the links between white support for Barack Obama and his policies, racial resentment, polarization, and how the election of Barack Obama has caused scholars of black politics to revisit some of its core assumptions. Despite several studies examining the relationship between white support for Barack Obama and racial resentment, we still know very little about how the Obama presidency may have influenced levels of trust in government among citizens.

A significant amount of research suggests that trust in government is a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. Since the early 1970s, scholars have noted a significant decline in levels of trust in government. This decline is exasperated when scholars investigate political trust in government by race. Prior research on descriptive representation contends that African American political representation may have a positive impact on citizens' attitudes toward politicians and governmental institutions.<sup>3</sup> The findings of these studies may have profound political implications for the influence of America's first African American on levels of trust in government. In 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders found an important link between African American distrust in government and the lack of African American political representation.

Although political scientists have devoted a significant amount of attention to examining whether white Americans would vote for Barack Obama, very little attention has been sought to investigate the impact of race on racial resentment and levels of trust in government within the context of the Obama presidency. With so much scholarly attention focusing on vote choice among whites, scholars have missed a significant opportunity to examine how the descriptive representation of America's first African American president may have influenced levels of trust in government and racial resentment among blacks and whites.

In this chapter, we investigate how African American political representation affects trust in government and racial attitudes. Specifically, we ask: What impact has Barack Obama's presidency had on racial attitudes within the United States when measured in terms of racial resentment, and to what degree did America's first phenotypically black president impact levels of trust in the United States government? Using survey data collected by the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 2004–12, we find that the Obama's presidency has had a dividing impact on both levels of racial resentment and trust in government by race. Although levels of racial resentment and trust in government seem to be similar in 2008 among

blacks and whites, we find significant racial divides in subsequent years following Barack Obama's election and reelection.

### **2008: The Hopeful Optimism of a Postracial Society**

The historic election of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election marked a very important moment in American politics in that the United States of America elected its first African American president. In 2008, "the United States became the only advanced industrialized democracy to have elected as its head of government an individual from a minority racial-ethnic group."<sup>4</sup> The election of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States resulted in many political pundits, analysts, and news anchors arguing that America has entered into "a postracial society." In the view of these individuals, the symbolic election of a black man to the nation's highest political office represented a transition from an era when race served as a political barrier that prevented blacks from being elected to political offices outside of majority black districts. Several scholars suggest that race did not play a factor in the 2008 election. These scholars suggest that the 2008 election had "no visible scars of racism attached to the nation or the Republican Party."<sup>5</sup> As further evidence that race was not a factor, Abigail Thernstrom used the 2008 presidential election of Barack Obama as an opportunity to argue that white voters no longer use race to evaluate black candidates. She is quoted as saying that the election of America's first phenotypically black president "will allow black parents to tell their children, it really is true: the color of your skin will not matter."<sup>6</sup> On November 5, 2008, *The New York Times* advanced this postracial narrative by publishing the following headline: "Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Decisive Victory,"<sup>7</sup> highlighting Barack Obama's Electoral College victory of 353 votes over Senator John McCain's 185.

Immediately following the 2008 presidential election, the postracial narrative continued to dominate the political discourse in American politics. Members of both the black and white communities interpreted the descriptive representation of Obama's election as evidence that the past vestiges of racism were no longer prevalent. Robert Franklin, president of Morehouse College, a prominent historically black college, appeared on a talk show and stated the following:

Oh, I'll tell you, it was an amazing theme that began to emerge that can be summarized in two words: no excuses. I mean, one after the other they got up and said, "You know, after this election it means there're no excuses for our academic underperformance, for our irresponsible behavior—no

excuses. And one of the young men looked at the rest of the students and said, “You guys, there are a few of you who come to class late, a few of you who are not prepared for class—no excuses.” So it’s interesting the way in which the sense that Obama has achieved this, we are now able to achieve. America permits achievement.<sup>8</sup>

The ideas depicted in the above assertion suggest that the election of Barack Obama eradicated discrimination and that blacks should somehow stop using excuses and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. What is shortsighted about Dr. Franklin’s comments is that he ignores the systemic nature of racism and places the onus solely on the individual behavior of African Americans. Even though the election of Barack Obama was indeed historic, his election did very little to change the discriminatory practices in employment, housing, education, income, wealth, and the criminal justice system. In many ways, Dr. Franklin’s comments embrace the politics of respectability and racial conservatives’ assessments of the predicament of African American people. These same arguments contend that many of the disparities facing African Americans are a result of laziness and individual bad decision-making.

Shortly after the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, racial tension in the United States increased dramatically. From the unprecedented opposition faced by the Obama administration to the murders of several unarmed black teens, America’s reaction to the Obama presidency revealed that the country is anything but postracial. In *Black Presidency: Barack Obama and the Politics of Race in America*, Dyson notes:

Obama has faced levels of resistance that no president before him has confronted. No president has had his faith and education questioned like Obama. No other president has had his life threatened as much. No other president has dealt with racial politics in Congress to the extent of being denied an automatic raise in the debt ceiling, causing the nation’s credit rating to drop. No other president has had a representative shout “You lie!” during a speech to Congress. No other president has been so persistently challenged that he has had to produce a birth certificate to settle questions of his citizenship.<sup>9</sup>

As early as his first term, scholars noted the spillover effects of racial attitudes into opposition to President Obama’s signature policy achievement—the American Affordable Healthcare Act. Michael Tesler argues that strong racial attitudes against President Obama have the potential to prime white opposition not only to Obama but to his policies as well. Additionally, scholars have found racial resentment to be a strong predictor of his job

performance and white political behavior. In fact, scholars such as Michael Tesler found that President Obama's association with issues like health care polarized public opinion by racial attitudes and race in ways that were unprecedented. Not only have scholars found massive levels of polarization, they have also found Barack Obama's presidency to be a strong predictor of old-fashioned racism. Under this framework of white racism, African Americans are lazy and lack intelligence. Further dispelling the fallacy of the notion of America's postracialism, Vincent L. Hutchings finds "scant evidence of a decline in the racial divide . . . blacks and whites remain as far apart on racial policy matters in 2008 as in 1988."<sup>10</sup>

Although the current scholarship examining the Obama presidency has taken different approaches, many of the themes suggest that the Obama presidency has certainly changed the political landscape in a number of ways. The Obama candidacy has changed the way we think about campaigns, winning strategies, and building winning coalitions in national campaigns. From a symbolic perspective, President Obama represents racial progress and just how far the nation has come since the 1960s. On the flip side, Barack Obama's presidency has reminded America that the United States has yet to grapple with deep vestiges of race and racism. As historic as Obama's presidency has been from a symbolic standpoint, its impact on racial polarization in America has been baffling. To use the words of one scholar, "Mass politics had become more polarized by racial attitudes since Barack Obama's rise to prominence. That is, the election of President Obama helped usher in a most-racial political era where racially liberal and racially conservative Americans were more divided over a whole host of political positions than they had been in modern times."<sup>11</sup>

### **Linking Descriptive Representation and Political Trust in Government**

The academic literature has missed an important opportunity to examine the degree to which Barack Obama's election as president of the United States has impacted levels of trust in the federal government. The extant literature concerning descriptive representation provides important theoretical conjectures that are useful in understanding Obama's influence on trust and racial attitudes among blacks and whites. One of the core themes of the prior literature suggests that descriptive representation may have a positive impact on how citizens view public officials and political institutions. Descriptive representation refers to the degree to which elected officials share identities such as race and gender with their constituencies. For example, Barack Obama descriptively represents African Americans. A substantial body of political science research examines the extent to which

descriptive representation yields substantive representation. The implications of this body of work suggest that an increase in African American representation may be associated with an increase in trust in government among members of the African American community. Implicit in these studies is the idea that African American politicians will use their political power to advance issues that are important to African Americans, thereby creating a sense of political inclusion, which may increase political trust.

### **Defining Political Trust**

Before moving into a deep exploration of the academic literature on political trust, it is important to establish what is meant by the term *trust*. Scholars such as Arthur Miller have characterized political trust as a combination of both positive and negative assessments of the national government.<sup>12</sup> Under this conception, political trust captures how citizens evaluate both trust in politicians and the overall function of and process of government. According to Mangum, “Political trust is mainly concerned with expectations and their relationship to the outcomes of government’s actions.”<sup>13</sup> It is important to note that scholars disagree about how to interpret low levels of political trust. For example, Citrin argues that declining levels of trust in government represent negative evaluations of politicians and policies, whereas Miller suggests that low levels of trust represent an indictment of the system.<sup>14</sup>

### **Determinants of Political Trust**

Although scholars have examined trust in government from a variety of different perspectives, the empirical record demonstrates that since the 1970s Americans generally have become more distrusting of government. Early studies on political trust explored whether decreases in political trust were results of disaffection with the overall performance of the government<sup>15</sup> or dissatisfaction with political leaders. Social scientists have cited several factors from cultural to political that influence trust. Several scholars have linked trust in government to the performance of the national economy. These studies predict that an increase in negative beliefs about the economy’s performance is associated with increased levels of distrust. Other scholars suggest that societal issues such as scandals, corruption, crime, and poverty all influence levels of trust. In addition to the economic and societal factors, scholars have found citizens’ evaluations of political institutions and politicians to be significant predictors of distrust.<sup>16</sup>

Even though scholars tend to agree that a lack of descriptive representation is linked to African American distrust in government, much of the current scholarship has neglected an opportunity to interrogate Barack Obama's influence on political trust. Mangum provides a compelling theoretical examination of political trust among African Americans by empirically investigating the psychological involvement, policy stratification, and reference group models. He finds that each of these models significantly influences African American trust in government. Although his study has contributed to our understanding of the dynamics of political trust among African Americans by using the 1996 National Black Election Study, he is unable to investigate whether the descriptive representation of America's African American President has had any impact on African American trust in government. In fact, his analysis only includes African Americans; thus he is unable to compare levels of trust in government among African American and whites. Shayla C. Nunnally also shows that African Americans are less trusting of government. She argues that because African Americans have suffered from a long legacy of disenfranchisement, violence, intimidation, and the failure of the United States government to provide equal protection under the law, African American trust in government has been breached, resulting in substantially lower levels of trust in American democracy. Like Mangum's seminal work, Nunnally's work does not address Barack Obama's influence on trust.

### **Theories of Political Trust**

Several theories have been used to explain political trust. A widely accepted assumption within political science suggests that the more citizens trust their government, the better democracy functions; yet African Americans have long maintained strong levels of distrust for government. Many scholars examining trust in government among African Americans have linked distrust to several theories that deal with the political conditions of African Americans, descriptive representation, and public policy. Although the study at hand does not test each of these theories, we contend that several of them provide important theoretical contributions in scholarly understandings of trust and distrust in the American electorate within the context of the Obama presidency.

Mangum's most profound critique regarding the academic literature on political trust is that it lacks theoretical development. In an attempt to fill this void, he applies three theoretical frameworks to explain political trust among African Americans. The frameworks he uses are as follows: the



psychological model, the policy satisfaction model, and the reference group model.

### **Psychological Involvement Theory of Political Trust**

The psychological involvement model is concerned with capturing the political, social, and economic position of African Americans within the United States. Simply put, the psychological involvement model is predicated on political efficacy, that is the degree to which individual citizens believe that they can impact the actions, decisions, and policy outputs of government. According to Mangum, “Lacking a voice in, or some control over, the decision-making process causes people to become skeptical about the political outcomes.”<sup>17</sup> Under this model, if citizens believe that they do not have political power and influence, they are likely to exhibit negative feelings toward government. Additionally, the psychological involvement model posits that if citizens perceive that the government is not responsive to their concerns, they may be less likely to trust government and government leaders. African Americans within the United States have historically been victims of discrimination. From slavery to Jim Crow, African Americans have and continue to face a plethora of challenges in their efforts to be treated equal. Given that there is a massive body of academic literature that suggests that political efficacy has had a profound impact on the political behavior of African Americans, it is highly likely that political efficacy may be linked to lower levels of political trust.

### **The Policy Satisfaction Theory of Political Trust**

The policy satisfaction model rests on the assumption that political trust is linked to the degree to which citizens are satisfied with the policy outputs of government.<sup>18</sup> Democratic theorists argue that a healthy democracy rests on the notion of popular sovereignty, that is, the ability of citizens to exercise control over the decisions of government. According to Citrin, citizens’ trust for politicians and political institutions is conditioned on how well politicians are able to serve as problem solvers. Many empirical studies show that when citizens are satisfied with the policy outputs of government, they tend to exemplify stronger levels of trust in government.<sup>19</sup> Marc Hetherington suggests that when citizens perceive that the policies produced by the government are effective, they are likely to have stronger levels of trust in government than those who do not see the policy outputs as effective.

But how might this particular theory apply to African Americans? Because African Americans have historically faced disenfranchisement and discrimination, the policy outputs of government are important. In many instances, politicians have refused to directly take on race-based policy initiatives. According to Maurice Mangum, “government’s ability or willingness to address this problem should impact African Americans’ trust in government.”<sup>20</sup> At its core, this model assumes that African American trust in government is a function of whether African Americans believe the government is taking meaningful steps to eradicate discrimination. Simply put, if African Americans believe that progress is being made to address discrimination, they may be more likely to trust government; if they do not believe that progress is being made, they will be less likely to trust government.

### **The Group Reference Theory of Political Trust**

The reference group model deals directly with descriptive representation and references to characteristics such as political party among political leaders. This particular model associates political trust with increased levels of descriptive representation. One scholar argues that “given the amount of descriptive representation for African Americans at the national levels of government, the actual political reality is their lack of descriptive representation.”<sup>21</sup> This model raises important questions about the intersections of political trust, the descriptive characteristics of politicians, and heuristics. For example, in the absence of African American political representation, what cues do African Americans use to assess their levels of trust for politicians that are not of the same race? Scholars suggest that in the absence race, an individual’s affinity toward a group’s political party has the ability to serve as an important cue.<sup>22</sup> For example, if Republicans are in control of the government and individuals have positive feelings toward the Republican Party, then the individuals should be more likely to have positive evaluations of the government.

### **Racial Attitudes and the Obama Presidency**

Another important element that this chapter investigates is President Obama’s influence on racial attitudes. There is an extensive literature on how racial attitudes have primed opposition to President Obama and his policies. Many were quick to label the election of Barack Obama as the start of a postracial society. Yet exit polling and ANES data seem to suggest that the election and candidacy of Barack Obama led to perhaps the

strongest impact of racial attitudes on presidential evaluations and the 2008 vote choice in the history of such measures. Political scientists for several years have sought to explain white resistance to African American candidates. These studies consistently demonstrate that high levels of racial resentment are linked to opposition of African American candidates and race-targeted policies.

The racial resentment thesis is predicated on the notion that older forms of racism such as overt racism (i.e., Jim Crow) has evolved into a new form of racism known as symbolic racism or racial resentment. Although Jim Crow rests on the idea that blacks are morally inferior and are therefore not worthy of sharing the same public facilities and residential areas, symbolic racism, also known as racial resentment, is based on “a blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic.”<sup>23</sup> Racial resentment contends that prejudice in the evaluation of black candidates stems from the denial of the continued struggle for equality among African Americans. The opposition from whites who are racially resentful rests in symbolic racism rather than a realistic threat to white political interest.<sup>24</sup> Sears asserts that racial resentment is “a mixture of anti-black feelings with the finest and proudest of traditional American values, particularly individualism.”<sup>25</sup>

The framework of symbolic racism was first introduced by Kinder and Sears in a 1981 study that investigated the impact of white racial attitudes on vote choice in the Los Angeles mayoral election of 1969. Kinder and Sears argue that symbolic racism is developed early in life, which stems from negative ideas toward African Americans intersecting with conservatism. Additionally, several studies have found that symbolic racism is a strong predictor of white opposition to black candidates and is indirectly related to nonracial issues such as welfare, busing, and crime.<sup>26</sup>

### **Critiques of Racial Resentment**

Although racial resentment has been found to be a predictor of white political behavior, the meaning and measurements of this theory have not gone without their share of critics. Scholars have questioned its validity and whether it is a manifestation of racism and not just simply conservatism.<sup>27</sup> Despite this criticism, many of the studies challenging the racial resentment model have been rebutted and scholars have found the conceptualization of racial resentment to be empirically valid.

Many scholars recently created additive scales to capture racial resentment. This has resulted in a number of criticisms against racial resentment both empirically and theoretically. Tarman and Sears outline and address

each of the four major criticisms against the racial resentment model. They note that racial resentment has been challenged in the following ways: (1) having been conceptualized and measured inconsistently over time; (2) that it may not be a single, internally consistent and coherent belief system; (3) that it may generate repressed strong associations with racial policy preference because of content overlap between measures of the independent and dependent variables; and (4) is racial resentment a distinctive belief system in its own right or does it simply reflect various other familiar constructs.<sup>28</sup>

Tarman and Sears contend that while some empirical analyses have certainly been inconsistent with measuring racial resentment, overall studies have been consistent in measuring racial resentment.<sup>29</sup> In measuring racial resentment, scholars have examined the following themes: (1) the denial of continued discrimination for blacks; (2) blacks should try harder; (3) blacks should work their way up without any special favors; and (4) blacks have received more than they deserve.<sup>30</sup>

In addressing the question of racial resentment, a single internally consistent belief system, Tarman and Sears note, “The theory represents these four themes as a logically consistent view of black’s place in society and the polity: blacks are no longer much discriminated against, so remaining disadvantages must result mostly from their own lack of effort.”<sup>31</sup> Racial resentment has also been criticized by scholars citing that it has a strong association with white racial policy preferences only because the items used to capture both concepts are similar in content.

The major questions concerning critics of racial resentment center on the question, is racial resentment a “distinctive and independent belief system or is it merely redundant with older concepts that have traditionally been used to explain racial attitudes, such as political conservatism, old fashion racism, individualism, or anti egalitarianism?”<sup>32</sup> The empirical test does not support this critique; in fact, Tarman and Sears find that in both the 1986 and 2000 ANES data, the items used to measure racial resentment are due to a factor other than ideology and party identification.

Essentially, symbolic racism has faced a number of critics; however, as Tarman and Sears suggest, these criticisms are not supported empirically. Despite such critics, the measures of racial resentment have been found to be predictors of a number of political attitudes and behaviors.<sup>33</sup> Scholars have even controlled for a number of other variables in multivariate analyses, and racial resentment remains a significant predictor of attitudes and behaviors. The extant literature reveals that racial resentment continues to shape attitudes on racial and nonracial attitudes, attitudes toward African

American candidates, attitudes toward the Confederate flag, and partisan identification among Southern whites and vote choice.

For many African Americans, the Obama presidency symbolizes an important mark in American politics. Historically African Americans have always exemplified strong levels of distrust in government. One of the benefits of descriptive representation is the idea that it presents under-represented groups with a sense of inclusiveness. The Obama presidency presents an ideal opportunity to empirically interrogate the impact of race on racial resentment and trust in government. Previous studies have not examined how the Obama presidency might have impacted racial resentment between both blacks and whites, and these studies have also neglected to investigate how race might have impacted levels of trust in government as a result of the Obama presidency. Political scientists who do study racial resentment have not given much thought as to what it means when African Americans exemplify strong levels of racial resentment.

Because America has never had an African American president, it is logical to expect that the excitement and apprehension in 2008 for an Obama presidency might have impacted both levels of racial resentment and trust in government among blacks and whites. We suspect that to several Americans the Obama presidency might have symbolized this fictional postracial moment in America when African Americans no longer face racial barriers. If this is the case, then there may be an expectation that his presidency in 2008 might have activated stronger levels of racial resentment within both groups. However, it is important to note that one must account for the political climate. Shortly after the 2008 election, many Americans were exposed to the realities of the Obama presidency and repeated acts of blatant racism. It is these realities that have the potential to cause whites and blacks to react differently. Once Americans witnessed the realities of the Obama presidency and how society at large responded to America's first African American president, one can reasonably argue that in 2012 both whites and blacks would have responded differently to racial resentment and level of trust in government.

We suggest that blacks and whites may have interpreted Barack Obama's election differently. For African Americans, his election may have been seen as an opportunity for a black man to utilize his political office to address issues important to the African American community. It is this hopeful optimism that we contend may lead to temporary increased levels of political trust among African Americans. Additionally, we assert that if African Americans believed that the election of Barack Obama symbolized the breaking down of racial barriers, then African Americans may embrace the

notion that African Americans no longer have reasons for excuses and therefore may have more attitudes that could be characterized as racially resentful. For many white Americans, we contend that Barack Obama's rise to political power represents a threat to the white political power and therefore may activate strong levels of racial resentment and decrease political trust.

## Data and Methods

The data for this empirical analysis were taken from the ANES Survey covering the years 2004, 2008, and 2012, a data source that has consistently been used to explain racial attitudes. Although it does not provide a strong enough sample to investigate black attitudes alone, we believe it is sufficient for making the kind of comparisons and generalizations we make below. It is important to examine the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections so that the impact of race on political attitudes can be compared. The following are the two models we test.

$$\text{Political trust} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Race} + \beta_2 \text{ Obama feelings} + \beta_3 \text{ Education} + \beta_4 \text{ Income} + \beta_5 \text{ Ideology} + \beta_6 \text{ Past vote} + \beta_7 \text{ Feelings about the economy} + \varepsilon$$

$$\text{Racial resentment} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Race} + \beta_2 \text{ Obama feelings} + \beta_3 \text{ Education} + \beta_4 \text{ Income} + \beta_5 \text{ Ideology} + \beta_6 \text{ Past vote} + \beta_7 \text{ Feelings about the economy} + \varepsilon$$

## Measuring Racial Resentment and Trust

We are interested in explaining two specific variables in this analysis: racial resentment and trust in government. Racial resentment is measured on a scale ranging from 3 to 15. Using the measures created by Kinder and Sanders, three items were taken from the ANES data and used to create a racial resentment index. ANES researchers asked white respondents to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
2. It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
3. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

The racial resentment index was created by taking the responses to the above questions and recoding them in a way such that lower scores mean

the respondent had less racial resentment and higher scores indicate the respondents harbor more racially resentful attitudes.<sup>34</sup>

Trust in government measures the level of trust the respondent has for the federal government to do what is right. Government trust is coded so that higher numbers mean the respondent has less trust in the federal government (1=trust just about always, 2=trust most of the time, and 3=trust some of the time or never).

When looking at both of these measures, blacks and whites had very different attitudes regarding racial resentment and trust in government prior to the election of Barrack Obama. This is most notable at the extremes (see Figure 8.1). Figure 8.1 displays how blacks and whites answered the first measure of racial resentment in 2004, 2008, and 2012. The first bar within each group represents the percentage of whites; the second bar




Figure 8.1 Denial of continued discrimination.




represents the percentage of blacks; and the last bar represents the percentage difference between the two groups. When asked about the denial of continued discrimination in 2004, the table shows there is a 30 percent difference between blacks and whites, with blacks being much more likely than whites to take the position of low racial resentment, 72 percent and 41.69 percent, respectively. The opposite is true at the highest racial resentment category. Whites are much more likely than blacks to take a position of high racial resentment, 47.5 percent to 19.1 percent, respectively. These positions represent a 30.4 percentage point difference in the least resentful category and a 28.4 percentage difference in the most resentful category.

Initially the Obama election seems to have had a diminishing effect on these attitudes. The 2008 attitudes suggest that there was a smaller gap between blacks and whites among these attitudes. Black support for the least resentful categories dropped to 62.6 percent while their support for the most resentful positions rose to 24.3 percent. The differences among the least resentful attitudes between the two groups decreased from 30.4 percent in 2004 to 23.9 percent in 2008, and among the most resentful it decreased from 28.4 percent in 2004 to 23 percent in 2008. These data suggest that the election of a black president may have created some degree of convergence of the two groups.

After the country had more experience with its first black president, we begin to see the attitudes reflecting this reality and possibly reacting to it. The black–white differences regarding opinions on the denial of continued discrimination illuminate the pervasive divisions that exist between these two groups. Blacks and whites seem to return to their previous views about blacks, with even more of a difference between the two. Figure 8.1 shows that now more than half (53.5%) of whites expressed views that were more resentful. At the same time, almost two-thirds (60%) of blacks expressed views that were least resentful. In the least resentful attitudes, the differences between the groups soared to 33.2 percent, and in the most resentful they soared to 41.7 percent. These differences are even *larger* than those observed in 2004.

A similar pattern is observed with each of the individual measures of racial resentment (see Figures 8.2 and 8.3). The differences in the least resentful attitudes for *Blacks should try harder* are 19.1 percent in 2004, 12.1 in 2008, and 31.3 in 2012. The most resentful attitudes show racial differences of 13.6 percent in 2004, 8.7 percent in 2008, and 27.9 percent in 2012. When asked whether *Blacks should work their way up*, we notice the low-resentment attitudes having differences of 25.2 percent in 2004, 12.3 percent in 2008, and 26.5 percent in 2012. The differences between






**Figure 8.2** Blacks should try harder.

blacks and whites who are most resentful are 29.1 percent in 2004, 15.5 percent in 2008, and a substantial 43.6 percent in 2012.

The 2012 differences when looking at the attitudes regarding the denial of continued discrimination and blacks’ ability to work their way up should not be overlooked. These measures show a difference of 41.7 percent and 43.6 percent among the most resentful respondents. Almost half (47.5 percent) of whites show racial resentment by denying the continued discrimination of blacks, and only 19.1 percent of blacks feel that way. Almost two-thirds of whites (62.7%) believe that blacks should work their way up like other groups. Again, only 19 percent of blacks share that attitude.

There is clearly a widening gap between the attitudes of whites and blacks when asked about issues of racial resentment. Although these



**Figure 8.3** Blacks should work their way up.

showed some signs of lessening in 2008, that gap reemerged in 2012 with an even greater gap between whites and blacks. More rigorous testing of the role that race plays in these attitudes is necessary to support our claims.

Our main concern here is that we are specifically interested in the differences between how blacks and whites have responded to Obama's presidency. Race is defined as "black," "white," and "other." Anyone who identified as multiracial was coded as "other." We believe attitudes toward Obama are the main driver toward racial resentment attitudes in 2012. This variable is measured by asking respondents to rate their feelings toward Barack Obama.

We use a number of controls in addition to the explanatory variables above. Abramowitz and Knotts and Abramowitz and Saunders found *political ideology* to be an indicator of vote choice; therefore, it is also important to control for this variable.<sup>35</sup> Ideology is measured on a seven-point scale

from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. One of the criticisms against racial resentment is that it is simply a cleavage of ideological preferences and attitudes.<sup>36</sup> It is important to note that ideology as conceptualized in these studies is measured as policy preferences of voters, using a number of social and political issues. The model also includes a measure of the respondent's vote in the previous election.

The national economy was at the center of the political debate during the 2008 presidential election; as a result, this analysis controls for *economic conditions*. The ANES data asked respondents if they believed economic conditions were better or worse. This variable is recoded as 0 if the respondent thought the economy was better and 1 if the respondent thought the economy was worse. Fiorina asserts that voters will engage in retrospective voting during times of economic hardship, and that this behavior has the capacity to trump partisan identification and racial attitudes.<sup>37</sup>

Several other variables that have been found to have a significant impact on political attitudes were also included in the model. Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani suggest that levels of *educational attainment* also impact vote choice; in order to test his assertion, we include a measure of levels of education.<sup>38</sup> This variable records the number of years of formal education a person has had. We also control for income, measured by household income, and vote in previous presidential election. The following hypotheses are tested below.

**H<sub>1</sub>:** *Race will be a greater predictor of racial resentment attitudes in 2012 than in the previous years.*

**H<sub>2</sub>:** *Race will be a greater predictor of trust in the government in 2012 than in previous years.*

**H<sub>3</sub>:** *Respondents who dislike President Obama will be more likely to show racial resentment.*

## Findings and Analysis

We use multiple regression to more thoroughly investigate the relationships that influence racial resentment and political trust. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show the results of the determinants of racial resentment and political trust. Table 8.1 displays the models across 2004, 2008, and 2012. The evidence is quite supportive of the hypotheses outlined above.

**H<sub>1</sub>:** *Race will be a greater predictor of racial resentment attitudes in 2012 than in the previous years.*

**Table 8.1** Determinants of Racial Resentment

	R <sup>2</sup> 0.30	R <sup>2</sup> 0.29	R <sup>2</sup> 0.30
	2004	2008	2012
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Constant	13.89** (1.21)	14.09** (0.80)	8.89** (0.67)
Race	-0.272 (0.20)	-0.332** (0.14)	-0.42** (0.14)
Obama feelings	-0.012* (0.01)	-0.04** (0.00)	0.651** (0.09)
Economy	-0.207** (0.09)	0.012 (0.12)	0.39** (0.14)
Ideology	0.704** (0.1)	0.226** (0.07)	0.26** (0.08)
Past vote	0.092 (0.11)	0.029 (0.08)	0.19 (0.228)
Income	-0.005 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Education	-0.390** (0.06)	-0.44** (0.06)	-0.25** (0.05)

<sup>a</sup>There were no questions on Barack Obama in 2004. Instead, respondents were asked to rate their feelings about Kerry on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being “cold” and 100 being “hot.”

\*Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

\*\*Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Our regression analysis shows that race did have a greater impact on racial resentment in 2012 than in the previous years (see Table 8.1). Race is a significant predictor of racial resentment in 2008 and 2012, but not in 2004. Because race is coded with low numbers representing whites, these values tell us that whites are more likely to have the most racial resentment attitudes across 2008 and 2012. When controlling for other factors, race has a negative influence on attitudes of racial resentment. A closer look at the values indicates that race has a greater influence from 2008 to 2012 (-0.33 to -0.42). Notice that race was not a significant predictor in 2004 and was a weaker predictor in 2008 than in 2012. This is support for our first hypothesis.

**H<sub>2</sub>:** *Race will be a greater predictor of trust in the government in 2012 than in previous years.*

Our second hypothesis is moderately supported by our analysis. Similar to our findings with racial resentment, race is not a significant predictor when explaining trust in 2004, but is a significant predictor in 2008 and 2012 (see Table 8.2). These models indicate another complexity that had occurred in the racial resentment models. The model has more explanatory power in 2012 (with the R<sup>2</sup> equal to 0.09 in 2004, 0.01 in 2008, and

**Table 8.2 Determinants of Trust**

	R <sup>2</sup> 0.09	R <sup>2</sup> 0.01	R <sup>2</sup> 0.19
	2004	2008	2012
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Constant	1.93** (0.24)	2.17** (0.25)	2.28** (0.11)
Race	0.06 (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.06** (0.02)
Obama feelings	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.09** (0.01)
Economy	0.06** (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)	0.39 (0.14)
Ideology	-0.05** (0.02)	0.02** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Past vote	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)
Income	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)

<sup>a</sup>There were no questions on Barack Obama in 2004. Instead, respondents were asked to rate their feelings about Kerry on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being “cold” and 100 being “hot.”

\*Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

\*\*Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

0.19 in 2012), and the parameter value changes from positive in 2008 to negative in 2012. Because higher numbers indicate less trust, this indicates that whites were more likely to trust the government in 2008 and *less* likely to trust the government in 2012. We believe this indicates that whites were frustrated by the Obama presidency and reacted negatively by taking that frustration out in their views of the national government. Unfortunately, the continued attacks on the president’s character and policies reinforced this pessimistic view. Although we do not believe this evidence conclusively indicates there is a greater racial impact in 2012 than there was in 2008, we do believe there is an important impact that race has on political trust.

**H<sub>3</sub>:** *Respondents who dislike President Obama will be more likely to show racial resentment.*

Our third hypothesis is also addressed in Table 8.1. According to this table, feelings toward Obama (toward Kerry in 2004) were important in each year. In 2004, people with lower feelings toward Kerry were more likely to have attitudes that reflected racial resentment. The 2008 and 2012 values show that those who are more unfavorable toward Obama are more likely to have attitudes showing racial resentment. This finding supports our hypothesis that disliking Obama influenced racial resentment.

## **Conclusion**

This analysis reveals that even though the United States has elected its first African American president, the American society is anything but postracial. In fact, the implications of this analysis suggest that race remains a significant predictor of racial resentment and trust in government. The candidacy and subsequently election of Barack Obama marked a milestone in the history of the United States of America; despite this historic moment, scholars such as Tesler, Sears, Knuckey, Ford, Maxwell, and Shields have emerged, arguing that the candidacy of Barack Obama activated strong racial attitudes among white voters and that those attitudes influenced the 2008 vote choice unlike any other election in the history of such measures.

This analysis finds that race is a significant predictor of racial resentment and trust in government. This analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is important to note that racial issues did not dominate the campaign in the 2008 election; therefore, the findings of this analysis suggest that despite having few overt references to race, there is something unique that subjects African American candidates to racial evaluations. The implications of this study suggest that the presence of an African American candidate is enough to activate strong racial attitudes, and limits white support for African American candidates. In addition, this analysis suggests that race is a strong predictor of racial resentment and trust in government. This study adds to the growing body of literature concerning the impact of race on racial resentment and trust in government by taking advantage of the one of the first opportunities to employ data over multiple years to analyze the political attitudes of whites and nonwhites in a presidential election. One of the major contributions of this analysis is that it is one of the first studies to examine the impact of descriptive representation at the presidential level to investigate the impact of race on racial resentment and trust in government. Research in political science has not given much thought about how to interpret racial resentment among blacks. In fact the racial resentment has been a model primarily applied to whites. This analysis seeks to engage this void in the academic literature.

It is ironic that many incorrectly attribute the social divisions within the United States to President Obama. Rather than finding that Obama divided the American people, we find the American people to be divided because of their reluctance to purge themselves of racism. President Obama violated their beliefs about the possibilities of blackness, but rather than reaching a new plateau, American racism required people to find new ways to continue racist beliefs. In the end, Barrack Obama was not “The Great Divider.” Good old-fashioned racism deserves that title.

---

**Notes**

1. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2016 Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
2. Dyson, 2016, p. 3.
3. Gay, 2002.
4. Knuckey, 2011, pp. 1–2.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
6. Thernstrom, 2008, p. 2.
7. Quoted in Nagourney, 2008, p. 1.
8. Quoted in “Spiritual Voices on Obama Administration,” 2009, p. 1.
9. Dyson, 2016, p. 12.
10. Hutchings, 2009, p. 917.
11. Tesler, 2016, p. 3.
12. Miller, 1979.
13. Mangum, 2012, p. 3.
14. Citrin, 1974; and Miller, 1979.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Hetherington, 1998.
17. Mangum, 2012, p. 5.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Hetherington, 1998.
20. Mangum, 2012, p. 6.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
22. Abney and Hutcheson, 1981.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 419.
24. Henry and Sears, 2002.
25. Sears, 1988, p. 102.
26. Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007.
27. Sniderman and Hagen, 1985.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. Kinder and Sears, 1981.
31. Tarman and Sears, 2005, p. 733.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 752.
33. Kinder and Sears, 1981.
34. For example, a respondent who is racially sympathetic is assigned a racial resentment score of 1, whereas a person who is extremely racially resentful is assigned a score of 5.
35. Abramowitz and Knotts, 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998.
36. Sniderman and Hagen, 1985.
37. Fiorina, 1981.
38. Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani, 2003.

---

## Bibliography

- Abney, Glenn, and John D. Hutcheson Jr. 1982. "Race Representation and Trust Changes in Attitudes after the Election of a Black Mayor." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45(1): 91–101.
- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2006. "Ideological Realignment in the American Electorate: A Comparison of Northern and Southern Voters in the Pre-Regan and Post-Reagan Eras." *Politics and Policy* 34(1): 94–108.
- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2008. "Forecasting the 2008 Presidential Election with the Time-for-Change Model." *Political Science and Politics* 41(4): 691–95.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *Journal of Politics* 60(3): 634–52.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior 1952–1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 35–50.
- Bobo, Lawrence, and James R. Kluegel. 1993. "Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?" *American Sociological Review* 58: 443–64.
- Caesar, James W., Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney. 2009. *Epic Journey The 2008 Election and American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Citrin, Jack. 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in American Government." *American Political Science Review* 68(3): 973–72.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, and David O. Sears. 1990. "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54(1): 74–96.
- Curry, Tom. 2008. "How Obama Won the White House." MSNBC. November 11, 2008. [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27540321/ns/politics-decision\\_08/t/how-obama-won-white-house/#V2iwIldRfdk](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27540321/ns/politics-decision_08/t/how-obama-won-white-house/#V2iwIldRfdk).
- Dyson, E. Michael. 2016. *The Black Presidency Barack Obama and the Politics of Race in America*. New York: New York.
- Easton, David A. 1965. *Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: New York Wiley.
- Ford, Pearl K., Angie Maxwell, and Todd Shields. 2010. "What's the Matter with Arkansas? Symbolic Racism and the 2008 Presidential Candidate Support." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40(2): 286–302.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gay, Claudine. 2002. "Spirals of Trust: The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 717–33.
- Henry, P. J., and David O. Sears. 2002. "The Symbolic Racism Scale." *Political Psychology* 23(3): 253–83.
- Hetherington, Marc. 1998. "The Political Relevance of Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 92(4): 791–808.
- Highton, Benjamin. 2004. "White Voters and African American Candidates for Congress." *Political Behavior* 26(1): 1–25.



- Howell, Susan E. 1994. "Racism, Cynicism, Economics, and David Duke." *American Politics Quarterly* 22(2): 190–207.
- Hutchings, Vincent. 2009. "Change or More of the Same: Evaluating Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(5): 917–42.
- Jackman, Simon and Lynn Vavreck. 2010. "Obama's Advantage: Race, Partisanship, and Racial Attitudes in Context." Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. April 21, 2010.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus Racial Threat to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(2): 414–31.
- Knuckey, Jonathan. 2005. "Racial Resentment and the Changing Partisanship of Southern Whites." *Party Politics* 11(1): 5–28.
- Knuckey, Jonathan. 2011. "Racial Resentment and Vote Choice in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election." *Politics & Policy* 39(5): 555–82.
- Knuckey, Jonathan, and Byron Orey. 2000. "Symbolic Racism in the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election." *Social Science Quarterly* 81(4): 1027–35.
- Krysan, Maria. 2000. "Prejudice Politics and Public Opinion Understanding the Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26(3): 35–168.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael, Charles Tien, and Richard Nadeau. 2010. "Obama's Landslide: A Racial Cost." *Political Science and Politics* 43(1): 69–75.
- Mangum, Maurice. 2012. "Explaining African-American Political Trust Examining Psychological Involvement Policy Satisfaction, and Reference Group Effect." *International Social Science Review* 87(1): 3–18.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women: A Contingent 'Yes?'" *The Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628–57.
- McConahay, John B., and J. C. Hough 1976 "Symbolic Racism." *Journal of Social Issues* 43(1): 69–76.
- Miller, Arthur. 1974. "Political Issues and Trust in Government 1964–1970." *American Political Science Review* 68(3): 951–72.
- Miller, Arthur H. 1979. "Type-Set Politics Impact of Newspaper on Public Confidence." *American Political Science Review* 73(1): 67–84.
- Miller, Arthur H., and Stephen Borrelli. 1991. "Confidence in Government during the 1980s." *American Politics Quarterly* 19(3): 147–73.
- Nagourney, Adam. 2008. "Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls." *New York Times*, November 4, 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.html\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.html_r=0).
- Nunnally, Shayla. 2012. *Trust in Black America Race Discrimination and Politics*. New York, NY: University Press.
- Orey, Byron. 2001. "A New Racial Threat in the New South: A Conditional Yes." *American Review of Politics* 22(2): 233–329.
- Orey, Byron. 2004. "Racial Attitudes and Support for the Mississippi State Flag." *American Politics Research* 32(1): 102–16.

- Peffley, Mark, and John Hurwitz. 2007. "Persuasion and Resistance Race and the Death Penalty in America." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(7): 996–1012.
- Peffley, Mark, Todd Shields, and Bruce Williams. 1996. "The Intersection of Race and Crime in Television News Stories: An Experimental Study." *Political Communications* 13: 309–27.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. 1972. *The Concept of Representation*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Reeves, Keith. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Fears White Voters Black and Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sears, David O. 1988. "Symbolic Racism." In *Eliminating Racism Profiles in Controversy*, edited by Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor. New York: Plenum: 53–84.
- Sears, David O., Jack Citrin, and Rick Kosterman. 1987. "Jesse Jackson and the Southern White Electorate." In *Blacks in Southern Politics*, edited by Laurence W. Moreland, Robert P. Steed, and Todd A. Baker. New York: Praeger, 209–25.
- Sears, David O., and P. J. Henry. 2005 "Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism and Its Critics." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37(3): 95–105.
- Sears, David O., and Donald R. Kinder. 1971. "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles." In *Los Angeles Viability and Prospects or Metropolitan Leadership*, edited by Werner Z. Hirsch. New York: Praeger, 51–88.
- Sears, David O., Colette Van Laar, Mary Carrillo, and Rick Kosterman. 1997. "Is it really Racism? The Origins of White Americans' Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61(1): 16–53.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Michael G. Hagen. 1985. *Race and Inequality: A Study in American Values*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Thomas Pizza. 1993. *The Scar of Race*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Philip E. Tetlock. 1986. "Symbolic Racism Problems of Motive Attribution in Policy Analysis." *Journal of Social Issues* 42(2): 129–50.
- "Spiritual Voices on the Obama Administration." *Religion and Ethics Newsweekly*, January 16, 2009. <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2009/01/16/january-16-2009-spiritual-voices-on-obama-administration/1991/>.
- Steele, Shelby. 2008. "Obama's Post-Racial Promise." *The Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 2008. <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-oe-steele5-2008-nov05-story.html>.
- Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. 2003. *Diverging Parties Social Change Realignment and Party Polarization*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Tarman, Christopher, and David O. Sears. 2005. "The Conceptualization and Measurement of Symbolic Racism." *Journal of Politics* 67(3): 731–61.

- Tesler, Michael. 2012. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 690–704.
- Tesler, Michael. 2013. "The Return of Old Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era." *Journal of Politics* 75(1): 110–23.
- Tesler, Michael. 2016. *Post Racial or Most Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears. 2010. *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post Racial America*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Thernstrom, Abigail. 2008. "Great Black Hope: The Reality of President-Elect Obama." *National Review Online*, November 6, 2008. <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/2264/great-black-hope/nro-symposium>.
- United States. 1988. *The Kenner Report for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. "Old Times They Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 672–88.
- Walton, Hanes. 1972. *Black Politics: A Theoretical Structural Analysis*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Weisberg, Herbert F., and Christopher J. Devine. 2009. "Racial Attitude Effects of Voting in the 2008 Election." *Typescript*. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.
- William, Gamson. 1968. *Scandal The Crisis of Distrust in American Politics*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.